Thirteen Days in September

Jimmy Carter's political life has taken interesting turns. He left office one of the most reviled chief executives in American history, but is now (mostly) revered as a humanitarian. His presidency was a series of missteps and bad luck, so much so that his greatest achievement, the brokering of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, kind of got overlooked. It happened in September of 1978, when Carter invited Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the presidential retreat Camp David.

The real-life drama is described in Lawrence Wright's Thirteen Days in September, a very readable and enlightening tome. Wright highlights how history brought three unlikely men together: Carter, a one-term governor of Georgia, was an unlikely president, and Begin was long on the fringes of Israeli politics, a Polish Jew who can be termed a terrorist for his activities resulting in hundreds of deaths.

Wright covers all the angles. Not only does he give us extensive biographical and psychological sketches of the three world leaders, but also of their entourages, particularly Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman of Israel, who were for a treaty, while Begin seemed to against it. Sadat is also an interesting figure, a man of great dignity and decorum, who was keen on making peace, but almost blew the whole thing.

There is also a great primer on the history of the conflict between the two countries, going back to Moses and Samson, right up to the founding of Israel in 1948 and the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. I lived through much of this stuff but after the reading the book I feel like I know now what I didn't before.

It was all Carter's idea: "Against the counsel of his closest aides and his own political interest, Carter had decided to risk everything. Camp David would not be about breaking a political impasse so that more talks could take place; it would be about creating a lasting peace agreement in the Middle East, with the signatures of all three leaders on the line." Carter's presidency was already in deep trouble, and it was like going all-in in poker.

Begin was the thorn in everyone's side. He balked at many things in the drafts of the agreement, most specifically about settlements in the Sinai peninsula, which Begin refused to discuss eliminating. Carter often accused Begin of being disingenuous about coming in the first place--he didn't seem like he wanted peace.

For an American, I think the most fascinating aspect of the book is the study of Carter. Today he is a cuddly grandpa, but he is frequently described as being a cold and ambitious person: "First of all, he was overly ambitious. He wanted to fix the entire problem if the Middle East. That was naive. He wasn't certain now that he could solve even a tiny portion of the conflict. His original vision--that Sadat and Begin could find their own solution to their problems--had failed. Their hatred and distrust for each other really did seem to be three thousand years old."

Furthermore, Wright describes many moments when Carter's anger erupted. The most dramatic moment was when Sadat, in a high dudgeon, was packing to leave. Carter accosted him: "Then let me tell you. It will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt. There is no way we can ever explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, into which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean an end of my presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you. Why are you doing it?" Wright then writes, "Sadat swallowed hard. Carter's cold blue eyes were only twelve inches from his." What a moment!

Begin finally caved and an agreement was reached. Wright thinks it might have been Carter's personally signing pictures for Begin's grandchildren, making the old warrior sentimental. In any event, though Carter was successful, it didn't help him politically in the U.S., as the failed attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages squashed any hope of his re-election.

Sadat would be assassinated by Islamic militants, his own people. But the treaty still stands: "The unresolved issues of Camp David have not gone away, but the success of the summit is measured by its durability. Since the signing of the treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1978, there has not been a single violation of the terms of agreement. It's impossible to calculate the value of peace until war brings it to an end."